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INTRODUcTION
'n Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons Inc. I a divided panel of the Fed-
.eral Circuit affirmed a JNOV granted on a jury verdict of infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents. In so doing, the panel majority
confirmed the applicability of guidelines from previous cases for de-
termining the threshold level of evidence necessary to get the equiv-
alents issue to the jury. This paper argues that despite powerful criticism
from the dissent, the common sense guidelines articulated in the
Malta majority opinion are not only necessary, but are appropriate.
Indeed, the paper argues that the Malta guidelines are fundamental
to the equivalents analysis, and therefore could be extended both to
bench trials involving the doctrine of equivalents and to the analysis
of structural equivalents under 35 U.S.C. 112, 6th ,2 whether tried
to judge or jury.
Part I of this paper reviews the jury's role in determining infringe-
ment, commenting on the jury's role in both claim interpretation and in
the comparison of the properly construed claims to the accused device.
Part II reviews the Nestier3 and Lear Siegler4 cases, key precursors to
the Malta decision. Part III reviews the Malta District Court decision5
as well as the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of the Federal
Circuit panel. Finally, Part IV considers the applicability of the Malta
threshold requirement to a bench trial setting involving 35 U.S.C. 112,
6th , and contrasts the Federal Circuit's approach in Malta to its ap-
proach in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon Inc. 6
I. THE JURY'S RoLE IN DETERMINING INFRINGEMENT
A patent infringement analysis is a two-step process.7 the first
step, interpretation of the patent claims (also referred to as a deter-
*0 Mark D. Janis, February 1992. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
** Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, Indiana
1 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 1991 WL 273823. At the time of this writing, Malta
had not yet been published in the Federal Reporter.
2 The 6th I of 35 U.S.C. 112 provides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function
without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
3 Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 739 F.2d 1576, 222 U.S.P.Q. 747 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
4 Lear Siegler Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
5 Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons Inc., _._F. Supp.-., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900 (E.D.Pa 1989).
6 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
7 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco S.P.A., 714 F.2d 1110, 1114, 219 U.S.P.Q. 185, 187
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
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mination of claim "scope") is said to be a question of law. 8 The
second step, comparison of the properly construed claims to the ac-
cused device, is considered to be a question of fact. 9 Infringement is
found only where each element of the properly construed claims is
found literally or equivalently in the accused device. 10 The patent
owner bears the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance
of the evidence.' 1
Despite the characterization of claim interpretation as a question of
law, the submission of the claim interpretation issue to the jury will not
itself result in reversal.' 2 Under appropriate circumstances, the jury may
properly interpret the claim terms en route to determining infringe-
ment.' 3 But the courts have had difficulty defining the precise circum-
stances when submission of the interpretation issue to the jury is appropriate
in the first instance, or, analogously, when the jury's implied interpre-
tation arising from an infringement finding should be overturned on
JNOV. Similarly, there is substantial disagreement, as best exemplified
by Malta v. Schulnerich Carillons, as to the quantum of evidence
required to justify submission of the second inquiry in the infringement
analysis (the "comparison" issue) to the jury.
A. The Jury and Issues of Claim Interpretation
One might expect that where the evidence yielded merely of a
dispute over claim interpretation, the infringement issue might be
taken out of the jury's hands and summarily resolved by the court.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has affirmed summary judgment on both
8 McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 671, 221 U.S.P.Q. 944, 948 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). See also Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal
Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282, 230 U.S.P.Q. 45, 46 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Moleculon Research
Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1270, 229 U.S.P.Q. 805, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
9 Palumbo v. Don Joy, 762 F.2d 969, 974, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10 SmithKline Diagnostics v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
1468, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551, 224 U.S.P.Q.
526, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
11 Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1545, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1412, 1417 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
12 Senmed Inc. v. Richard-Allen Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508, 1511
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
13 Tol-0-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546,
1550, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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the literal infringement issue14 and the issue of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents 15 on this basis.
Likewise, one might expect that when the patent owner has been
fully heard on the infringement issue and has left only an issue of
claim interpretation to be resolved, the trial court might direct a
verdict on the infringement issue16 or overturn the jury verdict on
JNOV. 1 7 As to the latter, the trial judge must determine whether thejury's comparison of the claim to the accused device is supported by
"substantial evidence" 18 and whether the comparison is made in
relation to a claim interpretation that can be supported in law. 19 Thus,
a trial judge might presumably decide that the jury's implied claim
interpretation is legally unsupportable, making JNOV appropriate. 20
14 See, e.g., Intellicall Inc. v. Phonometrics Inc., .._F.2d ._., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (summary judgment of no infringement); Johnson v. IVAC, 885 F.2d 1574, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
1382 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (summary judgment of no infringement); George v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 802 F.2d 421, 231 U.S.P.Q. 382 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (summary judgment of no infringement);
Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 223 U.S.P.Q. 706 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (summary
judgment of no infringement).
15 See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1456 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (summary judgment of no infringement); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
922 F.2d 792, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (summary judgment of no infringement).
16 Rule 50(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may
grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party on any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third party claim that cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue.
17 This is not surprising since a summary judgment motion is said to be decided under "es-
sentially the same standard as that for a motion for directed verdict or JNOV." Newell Companies
v. Kenney Mfr. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 763, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988), citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The commentary to Rule 50, Fed.
R. Civ. P. confirms this observation, providing in relevant part:
... The term "judgment as a matter of law" is an almost equally familiar term and appears in the text of Rule
56; its use in Rule 50 calls attention to the relationship between the two rles.... Because [the standard for
judgment as a matter of law] is also used as a reference point for entry of summary judgment under 56(a), it
serves to link the two related provisions...
18 Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence from the record taken as a whole as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the finding under review." Verdegaal
Brothers, Inc. v. Union Oil of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051, 1052 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987).
19 ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1581-82, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1557,
1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739
F.2d 604, 607, 222 U.S.P.Q. 654, 656-57 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1038 (1984);
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893, 221 U.S.P.Q. 669, 673 (Fed.
Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984); Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d
1506, 1513, 220 U.S.P.Q. 929, 936 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
20 See Senmed Inc., 888 F.2d at 815, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1513 (affirming grant of JNOV).
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However, "[e]very legal conclusion must be based on facts es-
tablished by evidence," ' 2 1 and claim interpretation is no exception.
Claim interpretation may well require consideration of factual ques-
tions, such as the description of the claimed element in the specifi-
cation, the intended meaning and usage of the claim terms by the
patentee, what transpired during the prosecution of the patent appli-
cation, and expert testimony as to what the claim term would mean
to one of ordinary skill in the art.22
Federal Circuit precedent is not as clear as it might be in defining
the jury's role in claim interpretation. The best that can be said is
that when "extrinsic evidence" (such as the prosecution history or
expert testimony) is needed to explain the meaning of a claim term,
claim interpretation should generally be left to the jury; the jury
"cannot be directed to the disputed meaning for the term of art." ' 23
Extrinsic evidence is usually needed where the claim term is a com-
plex technical term. 24 or a term potentially having a special meaning
to those of ordinary skill in the art different from its common, or-
dinary meaning. 25
However, the Federal Circuit has also noted that "even where
the meaning [of a claim term] cannot be determined without resort
to the specification, the prosecution history or other extrinsic evi-
dence," the court may properly find that, upon consideration of the
entirety of such evidence, there is no genuine issue of fact for the
jury.26 For example, conflicting options on the meaning of a term
21 Railroad Dynamics, 727 F.2d at 1513, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 936.
22 Tol-O-Matic, Inc., 945 F.2d at 1550, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336; McGill Inc. v. John Zink
Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672-75, 221 U.S.P.Q. 944, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1037 (1984).
23 McGill Inc., 736 F.2d at 672, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 948; Perini America, Inc. v. Paper Con-
verting Machine Co., 832 F.2d 581, 4 U.S.P.Q. (Fed. Cir. 1987), Palumbo v. Don-Joy, 762
F.2d 969, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
24 Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 287, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1996, 2000 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3199 (1989); Moeller v. lonetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 229 U.S.P.Q. 992
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
25 Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1866 (Fed. Cir.
1991); See also, Intellica4 ... _F.2d at _ 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1386.
26 Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1579, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1385; Howes v. Medical Components, Inc.,
814 F.2d 638, 643, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also Advanced Cardiovas-
cular Systems v. Scimed Life Systems Inc., 887 F.2d 1070, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1989),
in which the panel majority vacated a summary judgment of noninfringement on the basis that
extrinsic evidence (in the form of expert testimony) was necessary for claim interpretation. Judge
Newman, dissenting, argued that the District Court had correctly rejected the expert testimony
and had properly interpreted the claim.
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which are considered to be merely "conclusory" will not ipso factor
raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.27
One would expect, then, that a mere "conclusory" opinion as to the
meaning of a claim term might also fail to withstand a motion for
directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
No bright line rule exists for disentangling the factual inquiries
underlying claim interpretation from the legal conclusion, and none
is likely to emerge. However, District Court judges can assist in
imparting more certainty to this area by remaining sensitive to the
factual inquiries underlying claim interpretation when the matter comes
up for summary resolution or judgment on partial findings. To facil-
itate review, the District Court judge should specifically articulate
views on these factual inquiries. First, the judge should specifically
indicate whether the claim interpretation is based in part on "extrin-
sic" evidence.28 next, the judge should make particularized findings
of fact showing the presence or absence of any genuine issue of fact
arising from such "extrinsic" evidence.29 Such procedures might lead
to a clearer definition of the roles of judge and jury in interpreting
patent claims.
B. The Jury and Issues of Comparison of the Properly Construed Claim to the
Accused Device
Once a claim interpretation has been made, that interpretation
must be employed whether the comparison of the claim to the accused
device proceeds under a theory of literal infringement or infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. 30 Where a literal infringement the-
ory is used, the comparison requires a determination of whether in
fact the claim elements are literally present in the accused device, an
exercise presumbaly well-suited to the jury. However, where the
comparison involves an analysis of equivalents (either structural
equivalents under §112, 6th , or equivalents as defined under the
27 Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1385; BarmagBarmerMaschinenfabrikAG
v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836-37, 221 U.S.P.Q. 561, 564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
28 In all probability, extrinsic evidence will be relied upon.
29 If the inquiry is made in relation to a motion for judgment on partial findings, the judge
should specify why judgment follows as a matter of law. If on JNOV, the judge might direct the
parties to fashion special interrogatories to enable the jury to express specific conclusions as to
the extrinsic evidence. See Railroad Dynamics, 727 F.2d at 1516-17, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 939
(encouraging use of special interrogatories).
30 Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd. 781 F.2d 861, 870-71, 228 U.S.P.Q. 90, 96 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
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doctrine of equivalents) the comparison involves the application of
specialized legal principles in addition to an inquiry into facts.
1. Literal Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. §112, 6th
By its explicit terms,31 §112(6) permits a claim element to be
expressed as a means for performing a specified function. Such a
"means plus function" element appears on its face to cover any
means for performing the claimed function,32 and indeed, the Patent
Office has recently reaffirmed its longstanding position that for pur-
poses of patentability analysis of pending patent claims, means plus
function elements will be interpreted to cover any means for perform-
ing the claimed function, 33 despite recent Federal Circuit panel opin-
ions to the contrary. 34 For purposes of the infringement analysis,
however, it is currently clear that a means plus function element is
properly construed to literally cover only the corresponding structure
disclosed in the specification for performing the function and equiv-
alent structure.35 That is, §112(6) actually "operates to cut back on
the types of means which could literally satisfy the claim lan-
guage." 36
Thus, a jury comparing a means plus function element to an
accused device under a literal infringement theory must first identify
structure in the accused device which performs the identical function
as claimed in the means plus function claim element.37 Second, the
jury must determine whether the identified structure is the same as
or equivalent to that disclosed in the patent specification for perform-
ing the function. 38 Despite the somewhat convoluted legal frame-
work, this determination of literally infringing "equivalents" under
§112(6) is said to be a question of fact.39
31 See supra n.2.
32 To cite an oft-used example, a screw may be claimed as a "means for fastening," and that
language, on its face, would appear to cover screws, bolts, rivets, glue, magnets, and so forth.
33 See PTO Notice of Application of 35 U.S.C. §112, 6th , 43 Patent, Trademark, & Copyright
Journal (BNA) 161-67 (Dec. 19, 1991).
34 See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375, n.1, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1908, 1912, n.1 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35 See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
36 Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
37 General Instrument Corp., v. International Trade Commission, 946 F.2d 821, 841, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1178-79 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
38 See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishawpkc, 945 F.2d 1173, 1178, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1094,
1099 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
39 King Instruments Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 862, 226 U.S.P.Q. 402, 408 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
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2. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
Under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement may be found
if an accused device performs substantially the same overall function
or work, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the
same result. 40 At least the "way" portion of this analysis must be
applied to the claim on an element-by-element basis. 41 As with §112(6)
equivalents, the question of equivalency under the doctrine of equiv-
alents is said to be a question of fact.42
The doctrine of equivalents is limited in that infringement cannot
be found where the asserted scope of equivalency would encompass
the prior art. 43 The question of whether the asserted scope of equiv-
alents encompasses the prior art is said to be a question of law which
may have factual underpinnings. 44 A determination here might in-
volve an analysis of whether a "hypothetical claim," sufficient in
scope to literally cover the accused device, would have been allowed
by the Patent Office over the prior art. 45
Thus, a jury determining infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents may actually be impliedly undertaking a patentability
analysis in support of its conclusion if the hypothetical claim analysis
is relevant. Although the Federal Circuit has suggested that the hy-
pothetical claim rationale does not necessarily envision a "full-blown"
patentability analysis,46 it is difficult to determine what lesser pa-
tentability analysis the Federal Circuit comtemplates. 7
40 Graver Tank & Mfr. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328,
330 (1950); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
41 Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 936, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740. The element-by-element analysis
has generated a plethora of commentary. The author leaves for another day the question of whether
Judge Rich has altered this formula by his remark in Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, that "this
court has never adopted the three prong approach to determining equivalency of a limitation."
See infra n.95 and accompanying text.
42 Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1561, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1038 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 281 (1991); Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 936, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740-41.
43 Wdson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey &Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In this regard the equivalency analysis under the doctrine of equiv-
alents differs from that under §112, 6th . General Instrument Corp., 946 F.2d at 842, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1179-80. See infra n.142 and accompanying text.
44Jurgens, 927 F.2d at 1561, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1038.
45 Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1948.
46 Key Mfg. Group Inc. v. Microdot Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1806 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
47 See, e.g., We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l. Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1562
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (district court applying test analogous to hypothetical claim analysis failed to
consider obviousness, hence abused its discretion).
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The doctrine is also limited in it will not extend to allow the
patent owner to recapture through equivalence certain coverage given
up during prosecution. 48 The scope of equivalents to which the claims
are entitled in view of the prosecution history is said to be a question
of law. 49
Given these intricately intertwined questions of law and fact, the
need for specific guidelines as to what constitutes "substantial evi-
dence" of equivalents is great. As the following sections demon-
strate, a line of Federal Circuit cases culminating in Malta establishes
specific guidelines for "substantial evidence" of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. However, if the Malta panel is any in-
dication, the Federal Circuit remains deeply divided not only about
the propriety of the guidelines, but about how those guidelines should
be applied. Undoubtedly this signals disagreement as to the proper
roles of the judge and jury in resolving the equivalents issue.
In the area of §112, 6th structural equivalency, the Federal
Circuit has offered no specific guidelines. Worse, the approach taken
in at least one recent § 112(6) case is difficult to reconcile with that
taken in Malta. This is taken up in Section IV.
II. PRECURSORS TO MALTA
A. The Nestier Case
In Nestier Corp. v. Menash Corp.,5  the Federal Circuit was
asked to review a judgment of non-infringement entered pursuant to
a jury verdict. The patent owner, Nestier, asserted that the district
court had erred in refusing to give a jury instruction relating to in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents.51 In finding no abuse
of discretion in the district court's refusal to give the instruction, the
Federal Circuit set forth a standard for "substantial evidence" of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
In this case, the patent claims apparently 52 were directed to a
reusable tote box which was capable of both nesting (i.e., with lids
open, one box could be placed inside another) and staking (by way
of inset covers with a plurality of interdigitating teeth on each cover
48 Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870, 228 U.S.P.Q. 90, 96 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
49 Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 937, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
50 739 F.2d 1576, 222 U.S.P.Q. 747 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985).
51 Nestier, 739 F.2d at 1578, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 749.
52 The reported opinion of the Federal Circuit does not specifically set forth the patent claims
at issue.
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to prevent the boxes from sliding when stacked)., 3 The accused boxes
were dimensionally compatible with the patented boxes54 but did not
include the inset covers or teeth.
At trial, the patent owner Nestier showed through expert testi-
mony and demonstration that the accused tote boxes were compatible
with Nestier's boxes in both their nesting and stacking functions."
However, Nestier presented this evidence strictly in the context of a
charge of literal infringement.56 Indeed, Nestier's own expert witness
testified on direct examination that he had no opinion on infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents because he had found literal in-
fringement.57 In addition, during the conference after the evidence
on the form of the jury instructions, Nestier's counsel stated that the
doctrine of equivalents was not Nestier's theory.58
Writing for a five-member panel of the Federal Circuit, Circuit
Judge Davis noted preliminarily that the fact that Nestier's expert had
no opinion on infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and the
fact that Nestier's counsel stated that Nestier's theory was literal in-
fringement, did not mean that the doctrine of equivalents were per se
excluded from consideration in the case. 59 However, those statements,
taken in conjuction with "the lack of evidence in the rest of the record
to form a basis for analysis of equivalence by the jury," justified the
district court's refusal to include a doctrine of equivalents instruction. 60
Judge Davis commented on this lack of evidence as follows:
At no time did Nestier's attorneys or witnesses present evidence which was ex-
plicitly related to the jury in the Graver Tank terms of equivalence of function,
means, and result. Analysis of equivalence involves those three factors, and a jury
cannot be expected to be able to make any such determination absent evidence and
argument concerning the doctrine and each of its elements. *** That is not to say
53 Nestier, 739 F.2d at 1577-78, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 748.
54 The court commented with disfavor upon this presumably improper comparison of com-
mercial embodiment to accused device, See infra n.62.
55 Nestier, 739 F.2d at 1579, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 749.
56 Id.
57 Nestier's expert testified as follows:
I would never get to the Doctrine of Equivalence because I-1 think the claim describes the Menasha box so I
would never consider equivalence but I-I don't think that was your-I would not then have an opinion because
I don't think the Doctrine of Equivalence comes into play.
Nestier, 739 F.2d at 1580, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 750.
58 Nestier's counsel stated that:
I can't dispute that. It is not our theory. We have from the very beginning advocated direct literal infringement.




that the exact Graver Tank language must be used by attorneys and witnesses.
However, [Nestier], which bore the burden of proving infringement, had the re-
sponsibility of establishing that context at trial and of stating its case within the
context-but it failed to do so. 61
Nestier no doubt represents an extreme fact setting. By all appear-
ances, the patent owner's infringement case rested upon a comparison
of its commercial embodiment of its claimed invention to the accused
device, itself a fundamental flaw which clearly concerned Judge Davis. 62
Moreover, the doctrine of equivalents theory, coupled with the ar-
gument that it was inherent in the literal infringement claim, appears
to have been mere post hoc argument of counsel. These obvious
weaknesses notwithstanding, the court's explicity articulated concern
was that Nestier had never put the arguments in their proper "context
for the jury:
The fact that some of Nestier's arguments concerning literal infringement might
also have been relevant to an equivalency analysis is not sufficient, in itself, to
establish that evidence and context for a jury. Although evidence was present here
which-had the context been established-might have been related to equivalence
of functions and results, there was an absence of any such evidence concerning
equivalence of means.6a
B. The Lear Siegler Case
Nestier could have been limited to its facts. The resultant rule
would have been that the failure to provide the proper evidentiary
"context," combined with statements disclaiming reliance on the
doctrine of equivalents, justifies a finding that no "substantial evi-
dence" exists on infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Nes-
tier would then presumbaly have fallen into obscurity. Instead, some
four years later, a three-member panel of the Federal Circuit relied
upon Nestier, and probably extended it, in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy
Mattress Co. 64
In Lear Siegler, the jury found that Sealy's box spring assem-
blies infringed claims of two Lear Siegler patents under the doctrine
61 Nestier, 739 F.2d at 1580, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 749-50.
62 The court noted that "equivalence must be established with respect to the claims of the
patent, not (as was perhaps attempted here) for the commercial structures involved." Nestier,
739 F.2d at 1579, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 749.
63 Id.
64 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d 1422, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (before Skelton, Fried-
man, and Michel).
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of equivalents. 65 Sealy moved for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, arguing that Lear Siegler's counsel had neither explicitly relied
upon the doctrine of equivalents until closing argument nor proved
its elements. Specifically, Sealy argued that Nestier required that a
patent owner explicitly delineate to the jury, through testimony and
argument, the equivalence of function, means, and result between
the claimed and accused devices.66 The Federal Circuit agreed and
reversed. Judge Michel, writing for the panel, commented that "even
if there was adequate testimony on substantial identity of function,
means, and result, no testimony reasonably served to articulate the
comparison."67
The evidence which Judge Michel found fatally deficient upon
application of Nestier arose through cross-examination of the designer
of the accused device, particularly the following:
Q: Now, if you took Plaintiffs Exhibit #2-I have got two left over-if you took
those [torsion bar spring members] out and threw them away and you swung this
around, that would be the same design, wouldn't it:
A: I don't know.
Q: Well, just by looking at it, would you agree it is the same configuration.
A: What you have done is you have taken and made a whole different spring out
of what you had.Q: Perhaps. I am not arguing with you. I just want to know whether you agree.
A: You an do anything you want to.Q: If you took these two, cut this right here and cut it right here and put that up
there-
A: Okay, if we did-
Q: Yes.
A:-and if you patent describes it that way, I would say you'd have the same
spring.68
According to the Federal Circuit, this, coupled with counsel's sum-
mary assertion in closing argument that this testimony "had to do with
equivalents," was all Lear Siegler pointed to to support its position that
it had complied with the requirements set forth in Nestier.69
65 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1424, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1769.
66 Id.
67 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770.
68 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770-71.
69 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1771.
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After characterizing Graver Tank as requiring proof of infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents by an analysis separated into
the traditional three parts, the Court reviewed its decision in Nestier:
In order to assure such a separate analysis, we said in Nestier, as Sealy's counsel
argued before the trial court, a jury must be separately directed to the proof of
each Graver Tank element. The party asserting infringement must present "evi-
dence and argument concerning the doctrine and each of its elements." * * *
Absent the proper Graver Tank context, i.e., a showing how plaintiff compares
the function, means, and result of its claimed invention with those of the accused
device, a jury is more or less put to sea without guiding charts when called upon
to determine infringement under the doctrine. While we do not doubt the ability
of a jury to decide the factural issue of equivalence, to enable the jury to use its
ability, Nestier requires that the three Graver Tank elements must be presented in
the form of particularized testimony and linking argument. 70
Here, Judge Michel noted, the cross-examination testimony,
whatever its probative force, clearly was not broken down into the
three Graver Tank elements and thus did not constitute the required
"particularized testimony." ' 7 1 Moreover, counsel's summary asser-
tion that the testimony "had to do with equivalents" failed to qualify
as "linking argument," defined by the court as argument linking
72such evidence as was elicited to the three elements for equivalence.
Addressing the argument that it was extending Nestier, the Federal
Circuit explained that its decision was really no more than an explication
of what Graver Tank had always required in the july context:
It can be argued that the holding in Nestier is limited to where the doctrine of
equivalents was disavowed and that the alternative groud of absence of explication
of each Graver Tank element is not truly an alternative ground of decision but
merely dicta. Strictly speaking, it can be considered dicta because the result would
have been the same without it. Nevertheless, Nestier is binding precendent as to
what Graver Tank implicitly requires.73
The court then proceeded to defend the Nestier decision:
Nestier also was a well-reasoned decision of a five-judge panel of this court.
Writing for the court, Judge Davis persuasively noted that if a jury is to rationally
find all three elements of equivalence, it must be told what evidence establishes
the equivalence of the claimed and accused devices as to each element. Otherwise,
70 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1425, 1426, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770.
71 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1425, 1426, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1771.
72 Id.
73 Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1427, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1771.
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there is too much risk that the jury will simply compare the two inventions as to
overall similarity, in violation of Graver Tank. 74
III. THE MALTA CASE
A. District Court Decision
It took very little time for Lear Siegler to find its way into a
district court decision. In Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons Inc., 75 the
district court overturned a jury verdict of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents based on Nestier-Lear Siegler.
The patent-in-suit in Malta disclosed, inter alia, a clapper mech-
anism for allowing the loudness of a handbell to be adjusted while
the bell was being played. 76 A first embodiment (the "Fig. 3 em-
bodiment") provided a clapper having three opposing pairs of striking
surfaces: the first made of hard rubber, the second of slotted rubber,
and the third of felt or other soft material." A second embodiment
(the "Fig. 7 embodiment") provided three opposed pairs of buttons,
each having a differing degree of hardness.78
Claims 2 and 3 of the patent were both alleged to be infringed.
Claim 3 recited the invention as including "a plurality of striking
buttons positioned in opposed pairs.. .wherein each pair of buttons
has a different degree of hardness." 79 Claim 2, by contrast, required
"at least three opposed pairs of surface portions wherein each of said
pairs has a different degree of hardness. 80 The accused device, the
Schulmerich "Quick Adjust" handbell, had features similar to those
of the Fig. 3 embodiment.81
On special interrogatories, the jury found that claim 2 was not
infringed,82 but found that claim 3 was infringed under the doctrine
of equivalents. 83 The jury awarded $950,000 in damages.8 4 Schul-
74 Id.
75 ...._F.Supp. ., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900 (E.D.Pa. 1989)
76 Malta, _F.2d at _ 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1161-62.
77 Malta, ......F.2d at _ 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1162.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Malta, _7..F.2d at _ 21 U.S.P.Q.2d. at 1163.
81 Id.
82 Claim 2 required an indexing means, an element which was absent from the accused bells.
... _F.2d at , n.4., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1176, n.4 (Newman, J., dissenting).
83 Id.
84 Id.
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merich moved for JNOV and while its motion was still pending, the
Federal Circuit decided Lear Siegler.
In reviewing the jury verdict on motion for JNOV, the district
court found that the patent owner Malta presented "no more than brief,
conclusory evidence" that the accused bell infringed under the doctrine
of equivalents. 86 Specifically, Malta had proffered the accused bell itself,
a video taped demonstration, poster-type exhibits, and photographs. 87
In addition, Mr. Malta gave opinion testimony on direct examination
that the accused bell included "buttons or the equivalent thereof" as
recited in the claims at issue.' The district court found that this testi-
mony was insufficient under Nestier-Lear Siegler:
The expression in Malta's testimony, "buttons or the equivalent thereof," lays out
the controverted issue. Only a fact-finder, aided by particularized evidence as to
function, means and result of this claim element-specifically "buttons"-can prop-
erly decide whether the [accused] handbell has "the equivalent thereof." Although
there was some evidence in Malta's cross-examination as to the nature of the
buttons and their development, nothing approaches the detailed comparison of
function, means and result called for by the cases. 89
Noting that the proffered testimony left the jury to mere guess-
work in analyzing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the
district court continued:
The evidentiary explanation is lacking as to how and why, as contended by plain-
tiffs, these features are "buttons or the equivalent thereof." Otherwise, a finding
of equivalence, as occurred in this case, rest [sic] largely on the equivalence of the
ultimate result... To uphold this jury's finding would violate Graver Tank-Nestier-
85 Id.
86 Malta, _F. Supp. at _ 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903. The Malta case was not published in
the Federal Supplement.
87 Judge Newman, dissenting from the Federal Circuit opinion on appeal of Malta, compre-
hensively listed the infringement evidence. _.F.2d at _, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1173-74.
88 In particular, Mr. Malta testified as follows:
... .. Would you go on with your explanation of how the portion illustrated in color in the exhibit corresponds
to the claim language?
A. Right. The-as I described, we have a plurality of buttons, there's three sets, buttons or the equivalents
thereof, and they are in opposed pairs around the periphery. We've described how they are related to these
indexing slots in the underside of the brass clapper insert, and each pair has a different degree of hardness,
we've described that. Here again we have felt which produced a soft impact sound. Here, this would be in
relation to this slotted portion here where we have a slot in the core and at 180 degrees another slot, that would
be the medium impact position. And then the lowermost one would be the-this one opposed to this where we
have a solid plastic material in the impact plane producing a brilliant sound.
Id.
89 Malta, .. F.Supp. at , 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at -.
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Lear Siegler and would reduce the doctrine of equivalents to a result oriented catch-
all.9o
The patent owner appealed to the Federal Circuit.
B. Federal Circuit Decision
1. Panel Majority Opinion: Judge Rich
After dispensing with a procedural argument regarding suffi-
ciency of defendent's motion for directed verdict, 91 Judge Rich re-
viewed the legal standard for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.92 Judge Rich first commented on the Graver Tank test
as applied by Pennwalt and its progeny. While confirming the ap-
plicability of the overall function/way/result test mandated by Graver
Tank, the judge further opined that "Pennwalt did not set forth a test
as to how one proves that an element in an accused device is the
'substantial equivalent' of a claim." ' 93 Relying on statements from
Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A. Inc., 94 Judge Rich
claimed that "[tihis court has never adopted the three prong approach
to determining equivalency of a limitation. 95
...Thus, while comparison of function/way/result is an acceptable way of showing
that structure in an accused device is the 'substantial equivalent' of a claim limi-
tation, it is not the only way to do so..."
Having thus declined to propose "a formula of general applicability
for determining equivalency to a claim limitation," 96 Judge Rich pro-
ceeded to review the proofs of infringement under the doctrine of equiv-
alents, ultimately concluding that the proofs lacked "evidence to prove
90 Malta, .....F.2d at -.. 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903.
91 Specifically, Malta argued that Schulmerich's general allegations of insufficiency of the
evidence in its directed verdict motion were inadequate to support the JNOV motion. Judge Rich
dismissed the argument out of hand.
92 Malta, ... _F.2d at . 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1164.
93 Malta, _F.2d at . 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1165.
94 868 F.2d 1251, 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1962, 1968-69 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
95 As pointed out by Judge Newman in dissent, "[t]he panel majority's statement... will
surprise readers of some of our opinions." .__F.2d at .. , n.6, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1179, n.6(Newman, J., dissenting). Other commentators have, however, anticipated this reading of Penn-
walt. See, e.g., Adelman and Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in patent Law: Questions
that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 687-88 (1989); Note, Proving Patent
Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents: The Specific Evidentiary Requirements for Getting
to the Jury, 55 Mo. L. REv. 1105, 1120-21 (1990).
96 Id.
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either that all three prongs of the Graver Tank test [were] met or that
the 'buttons' limitation was met equivalently." 97
As to the testimonial evidence, Judge Rich examined the same
portions of the testimony relied upon by the district court, and arrived
at the same conclusion: the evidence of equivalents was insufficient.
In articulating his conclusions, the judge restated the Nestier-Lear
Siegler rationale as follows:
...what is clearly lacking in [Malta's] testimony is a sufficient explanation of both
why the overall function, way, and result of the accused device are substantially
the same as those of the claimed device and why the plastic/slotted plastic/felt
arrangement is the eqivalent of the claimed buttons limitation. Mr. Malta's offhand
and conclusory statements ('buttons or the equivalent thereof' and 'they function
like buttons') are not sufficiently particularized evidence. In short, with little guid-
ance, the jury was left to its own imagination on the technical issue of equiva-
lency. 98
Judge Rich then turned to the other evidence presented, observ-
ing that there was no other evidence rising to the level of substantial
evidence of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents sufficient
to save the jury verdict. 99 Review of the patent itself revealed no
such quantum of evidence supporting Malta's argument that the claimed
"buttons" were equivalent to the striking surface in the accused
device. 100 The language of the specification (comparing Figs. 3 and
7) and the claims themselves (claims 2 and 3) maintained a distinction
between "striking surfaces" and "buttons." According to Judge Rich,
there was no substantial evidence that "striking surfaces" and "but-
tons" were equivalent in "way." Application of claim interpretation
principles also yielded no substantial evidence of equivalents. 10
Judge Rich's opinion is perhaps most notable for its careful
avoidance of references to the Lear Siegler "particularized testi-
mony" and "linking argument" requirements. Indeed, Judge Rich
observes that:
[W]hile Lear Siegler does not go so far as to require recitation of the magic words
"function", "way", and "result", we think that it at least requires evidence to
97 Id., emphasis supplied.
98 Malta, __F.2d at _, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. Specifically, Judge Rich characterized claim 2 as using a broad term ("surface por-
tions") and claim 3 a narrow term ("buttons") relating to a specific embodiment in the patent.
Judge Rich then concluded that this raised the implication that infringement of claim 3 could be
avoided by not meeting the narrower term.
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establish what the function, way, and result of both the claimed device and the
accused device are, and why those functions, ways, and results are substantially
the same. 10 2
Doubtless this distancing from the precise Lear Siegler formula
is designed in part to counter arguments that Lear Siegler constitutes
new law being retroactively applied. 10 3 More importantly, however,
Judge Rich demonstrates that the Lear Siegler formula is simply a
set of specific guidelines for determining the existence of "substantial
evidence" of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Further,
the guidelines are not exclusive, merely exemplary. As long as there
is testimony or other evidence showing why the overall function, way,
and result of the accused device are substantially the same as those
of the claimed invention, the court should find the "substantial evi-
dence" requirement met.
Thus, Judge Rich's opinion establishes that Lear Siegler is sim-
ply an example of the fundamental exercise of defining the threshold
level of evidence necessary to support a prima facie of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. While Lear Siegler "set forth this
requirement in language particularly suitable to [a] jury case,"'" and
thus applies particularly to the determination of "substantial evi-
dence," the underlying principles should logically have broader ap-
plicability.105 In any event, the clear implication of Judge Rich's
opinion is that Lear Siegler represents the application of fundamental
Graver Tank principles; it is more than a mere isolated, prophylactic
rule for juries faced with equivalents issues.
2. Concurring Opinion: Judge Michel
For Judge Michel, "what is fatal in this record is the failure of
Mr. Malta to separate and explicate his comparative analysis of 'way'
from his comparison of 'function' and 'result' and to substantiate it. '"'06
Judge Michel found ample evidence of function and result, but the
testimony as to way "was brief, intermingled, inferential and conclu-
sory."' 10 7 Specifically, "[t]he jury was not separately and explicity told,
however, that drilling slots behind striking surfaces on a clapper made
102 _.._F.2d at -, n.4, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166, n.4.
103 See infra n.121-126 and accompanying text.
104 Malta, ..._F.2d at -, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1167.
105 This is explored in more detail in Section IV.
106 Id.
107 Malta, __F.2d at _., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168.
Mark D. Janis JPTOS
of the same plastic material is an equivalent 'way' compared to attaching
striking buttons made from different materials.' ' 0 8
Judge Michel noted that he was writing separately to "clarify
Lear Siegler,"'10 9 which, after all, he had authored. Judge Michel
explained that under Nestier and Lear Siegler, substantial evidence
of comparison of function, way, and result was required as part of
the patents owner's prima facie case of infringement. 110 Under this
approach, no amount of purely descriptive evidence will suffice ab-
sent "separate, explicit, and substantial" comparison evidence."'
Judge Michel's opinion carefully balances his desire to maintain
the viability of Lear Siegler with the need to avoid the argument that
Lear Siegler (decided some seven months after the trial in the Malta
case) was being applied retroactively. The judge insisted, as he had
dome in Lear Siegler itself, that Lear Siegler merely made explicit
what was already implicit in Graver Tank. If Lear Siegler had added
a gloss to Graver Tank, said Judge Michel, "it was on peripheral
points not dispositive here, such as the requirement of 'testimony'
(as opposed to other forms of evidence) and 'linking argument' (which,
being only attorney assertions, is of course not evidence at all)." 112
Where exactly this leaves the specific Lear Siegler requirements
of particularized testimony and linking argument is not at all clear.
If the required "comparison" evidence comes in by way of docu-
mentary evidence, would Judge Michel nonetheless reject it because
it is not particularized testimony? A hypertechnical approach such as
this would seem unjustified, and clearly would run counter to the
panel majority opinion, under which the evidence would be consid-
ered "substantial" so long as it explained "why" the claimed in-
vention and accused device were substantially the same in function,
way, and result.
3. Dissenting Opinion: Judge Newman
Judge Newman, entering a characteristically comprehensive thirty-
one page dissent, sternly reprimanded the panel majority for engaging
in "'post hoc, retrospectively imposed, micromanagement of the jury
trial process" which is "inimical to due process. ' '11 3 Adopting a tone
108 Id.
109 Malta, ._F.2d at - 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1170.
110 Malta, ._F.2d at .. , 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168.
111 Malta, __F.2d at -, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1169.
112 Id.
113 Malta, .. F.2d at _. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1180.
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strongly reminiscent of her past dissents in cases such as Senmed Inc.
v. Richard-Allen Medical Indus. ,' Judge Newman asserted that
[tjoday's paternalistic ruling that more and different evidence and argument are
required when infringement is tried to a jury diverts patent jury trials from the
mainstream of the law, a place assured by history and once accepted by the Federal
Circuit. 115 ... This court, by retroactively imposing new requirements for proving
infringement, then re-finding the facts under the guise of determining whether these
new requirements were complied with, has denied this litigant's historic right. I
do not lightly charge my colleagues with so serious a breach..."6
Although the dissent presents a multitude of arguments, it fo-
cuses on a few major themes.
(a) De Novo Determination of Infringement
Characterizing the majority opinion as a "de novo determination
of the factual issue of infringement," 1" 7 Judge Newman argued that
the majority departed from the precepts underlying the "substantial
evidence" standard of appellate review. Judge Newman reviewed
Third Circuit law on the standard of review, reciting the familiar
requirements that the reviewing court is not free to reweigh evidence,
pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its own judgment
for that of the jury." 8 Here, said the judge, the majority had substi-
tuted its own choice for that of the jury regarding conflicting elements
of the evidence." 9
Judge Rich's response is that the review is of the trial court's
decision to grant JNOV, not of the jury's verdict, and that it follows
from Graver Tank that the trial court's decision should not be dis-
turbed unless clearly erroneous.120 Judge Michel has yet a different
view-that the issue on review is the trial court's decision on com-
pliance with Lear Siegler, a question of law subject to de novo re-
view. 1
114 _.._F.2d at .... , 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1514 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting). There,
the panel majority reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict of infringement. See also Newell
Companies, 864 F.2d at 769, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Newman, J., dissenting).
115 Malta, ... _F.2d at ., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1179.
116 Malta, ._F.2d at _, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1181.
117 Malta, ._..F.2d at -, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1170.
118 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1171.
119 Id.
120 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1167
121 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168.
Mark D. Janis JPTOS
Judge and Jury Roles in Equivalents Analysis
This disharmony is disturbing, particularly in light of the uni-
formity the appellate review standard has previously enjoyed. It was,
after all, Judge Rich himself in Jurgens v. McKasy who wrote that:
On proper appeal from a judgment in a jury case, we review the decisions made
by the judge for prejudicial legal error.. .or abuse of discretion... Of course, we
review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a jury verdict on an issue of fact
to determine whether the jury's decision was supported by substantial evidence. 122
Judge Newman is surely correct in noting that a motion for JNOV
does not convert "appellate review of a jury verdict to simple review
of the trial judge's decision."123 Ultimately, the inquiry is whether "sub-
stantial evidence" was presented, and this is true at both the trial court
and appellate court levels.124 Recasting the issue as one of compliance
with Lear Siegler does not justify de novo review because the compar-
ison evidence required by Lear Siegler is, of course, part of the "sub-
stantial evidence" necessary to sustain the verdict.
(b) Retroactive Application of Lear Siegler
Because Judge Newman believed that Lear Siegler represented
new law, she argued that its retroactive application in Malta violated
due process. In support of her assertion that Lear Siegler extended
Graver Tank, Judge Newman looked to the language of the Graver
Tank opinion, pointing out the Supreme Court's statement that proof
of equivalents could be made in any form-through testimony, by
documents, or by prior art disclosures. 125The judge further suggested
that the majority had inappropriately added a "why" requirement to
the three-pronged function/way/result test. 126
Judge Newman then proceeded to again attack the "why" re-
quirement on its merits, noting that "an inventor need not know the
why of the scientific and technical principles underlying an inten-
tion." ' 127 Referring to Graver Tank, Judge Newman observed that the
patentee was not required to explain why magnesium and manganese
had the same properties. The soundness of this argument might be
122Jurgens, 927 F.2d at - 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1035 (citation omitted). See also Fonar Corp.
v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (patent owner must
show the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence to convince appeals court that trial
court erred in granting accused infringer's motion for JNOV).
123 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1180.
124 1d,; citing 5A Moore's Federal Practice. 50.07[2] (2d ed. 1985).
125 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1179, n.7.
126 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1171.
127 Malta, __F.2d at -, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1177.
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questioned. The principle to which the judge refers is one that allows
patentability of an invention where the technological "why" is un-
appreciated. Here the issue is entirely different: not the issue of the
technological "why," but of why two structures can properly be said
to function in substantially the same way." 8
Both Judge Rich and Judge Michel argued that Lear Siegler,
and Nestier before it, was merely an explication of Graver Tank. As
to the argument that the majority had added ,a fourth prong to the
three-pronged test, Judge Michel quite reasonably noted that "[T]he
apparently separate requirement of proof of 'why' is actually only an
elaboration on the requirement of equivalents as to 'way'." 129
(c) Existence of Substantial Evidence
Judge Newman next turned to the infringement evidence pre-
sented at trial, which was clearly voluminous. 130 Yet Judge New-
man's summary merely shows that much of this massive infringement
presentation did not reach the crucial issue of the equivalents of the
claimed "buttons" and the accused striking surfaces. For example,
the evidence relating to claim 3 shows that of seven claim elements,
only one (the "buttons" limitation) provoked any real dispute.1 31 In
addition, the patent specification itself established that the Fig. 3
embodiment (similar to the accused device) accomplished substan-
tially the same overall results as did the Fig. 7 embodiment (toward
which claim 3 was arguably directed). 132
Thus, the only serious challenge facing Malta was to supply
evidence that the accused bell functioned in substantially the same
way as did the claimed bell. Judge Newman argued that Malta had
presented ample evidence of way by showing that the way both the
striking surfaces and the buttons produce their differing tones is by
differing hardness. 133 For example, Judge Newman cited Malta's tes-
timony explaining by demonstration the changing of the brightness
128 Graver Tank can thus be reconciled; the question there was why magnesium and manganese
functioned in substantially the same way in the claimed composition. The answer was the observed
fact that the two had similar properties, so of course there was no need to explore why the two
had similar properties.
129 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168.
130 Mr. Malta's testimony alone took three trial days. Malta, .. _.F.2d at _, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1176.
131 Malta, __F.2d ..... at , 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1173-74.
132 Malta, .. F.2d ..... at , 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1174.
133 Malta, __F.2d ..... at , 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1177.
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of the accused bell's tone using the striking surfaces. 134 Presumably
this could be characterized as a description of the "way" the accused
bell's striking surfaces worked, but it was unaccompanied by a com-
parison to the "way" the claimed inventions worked, according to
Judge Michel. Indeed, Judge Newman's showing here is unpersua-
sive.
Judge Newman also noted that Malta had presented prior art
showing that striking surfaces, pins, and buttons were all known in
the prior art for use in connection with rotatable clappers. 135 Again,
however, this evidence was apparently not put into the context of
equivalents at the trial to fall back on language from Nestier. Since
the actual testimony is not quoted, it is difficult to analyze whether
the appropriate context was indeed provided.
Finally, Judge Newman seemed to suggest that the requirements
for substantial evidence could be eased when the invention is "sim-
ple." Commenting that "[t]hese bells are simple devices, "136 Judge
Newman expressed surprise that the evidentiary requirement "must
be fulfilled no matter how simple the invention.' 1 37 It is unclear
whether Judge Newman suggests that the Lear Siegler requirements
should not be imposed at all where the invention is "simple" or
merely that a lesser level of "particularized testimony and linking
argument" should be required. In either event, the "simplicity of
invention" standard, being wholly subjective, would be an unac-
ceptable addition to the analysis. 138
(d) Lear Siegler and the Jury Instructions
Judge Newman also argued that the accused infringer Schul-
merich should have requested jury instructions on the Lear Siegler-
type guidelines, and Schulnerich's failure to do so constitutes waiver. 139
But the Lear Siegler guidelines guide the trial judge in determining
whether substantial evidence exists; they are not a matter for consid-
eration by the jury. 140
134 Malta, .. F.2d ..... at -, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1176.
135 Malta, .... F.2d ..... at -, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1175.
136 Malta, .. F.2d at - 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1178.
137 Malta, _.F.2d at _ 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1172.
138 Judge Michel notes that there may be less need for the Lear Siegler guidelines when the
technology is "simple," but the guidelines should still apply. Malta, _.F.2d at _ 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1169.
139 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1178.
140 See Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1169. (Michel, J., concurring).
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Judge Michel adopted the latter stance and went even further.
Lear Siegler, said Judge Michel,
is based on the very premise that sufficiency of the instructions cannot cure an
insufficiency of proof as to the three Graver Tank requirements. The reason we do
not allow curing by instructions is that even with perfect jury instructions, deter-
mining infringement by equivalents would still be guesswork for a jury unless it
is given separate, explicit and substantial evidence of comparison as to each re-
quirement of Graver Tank.' 141
,perhaps Judge Newman was reacting to an underlying policy
tension. The jury instructions are prophylactic; one might argue that
the need for Lear Siegler guidelines is lessened by the presence of
jury instructions. However, even if that is so, given the existence of
the guidelines, they do not belong in the jury instructions.
(e) New Rules for Jury Trials
Judge Newman concluded her dissent by raising a number of
interesting questions respecting future application of Malta. First, she
reemphasized that the Malta requirements apply only to jury trials.
Judge Newman also argued that the Malta requirements conflict with
Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, citing Symbol Technol-
ogies v. Opticon. The Symbol case also raises the issue of what
constitutes a prima facie case of structural equivalents under § 112,
6th . These issues are taken up in the following section.
IV. APPLYING MALTA
A. Applying Malta to Bench Trials Involving the Doctrine of Equivalents
As Judge Newman correctly pointed out, Lear Siegler type re-
quirements have been imposed only in jury cases. One ought to won-
der why those requirements would not apply with equal force to bench
trials. Indeed, if Lear Siegler, as applied by Malta, truly sets a fun-
damental evidentiary threshold for prima facie proof of equivalents,
then it would seem to follow that failure to meet the threshold proof
would subject the patent owner to a Rule 52(c) "judgment on partial
141 Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1169.
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findings" in a bench trial142 just as it would subject him to a Rule
50(a) judgment as a matter of law in a jury trial, or to an adverse
summary judgment.
Of course, in Malta itself, the "comparison" evidence require-
ment was applied to determine whether the jury verdict was supported
by "substantial evidence," a necessary component of a prima facie
case of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in a jury trial.
In the bench trial context, the "comparison" evidence requirement
likewise could be applied to determine whether the patent owner had
established a prima facie case of infringement. The policy justifica-
tion-preventing the doctrine of equivalents from devolving into a
result-oriented catchall- applies with equal force to a bench trial.
The Federal Circuit should make clear that in bench trials on
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, as in jury trials, evi-
dence must be presented to demonstrate why the accused device per-
forms substantially the same function/way/result as the claimed
invention, and that one way to make the threshold showing is to
present "particularized testimony" and "linking argument." Failure
to do so in a bench trial should equate to failure on the part of the
patent owner to make out a prima facie case of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.
B. Applying Malta in View of Symbol Technologies v. Opticon
A further application of Malta deserves consideration-namely,
application to the analysis of structural equivalents under 35 U.S.C.
§112, 6th , whether tried to the judge or to the jury, in view of the
Federal Circuit's recent decision in Symbol Technologies v. Opticon.
Although the Federal Circuit in Malta sets forth specific thresh-
old requirements for determining the existence of "substantial evi-
dence" of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal
Circuit has recently treated §112, 6th equivalents quite differently
based on Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Symbol
142 New Rule 52(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., which replaces the Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal,
provides that:
If during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and the court finds against
the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law against that party on any claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated
without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all
the evidence. Such a judgment shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by
subdivision (a) of this rule.
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Technologies Inc. v. Opticon Inc., 143 Symbol Technologies had sued
Opticon on three patents relating to devices that employ lasers to read
bar code symbols.'" Since the claims included means plus function
elements, the literal infringement analysis included application of
§112, 6th .145 In a bench trial, the court found, inter alia, that certain
claims of the patents were literally infringed. 46 A three-member panel
of the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The decision, viewed alongside Malta, squarely raises the issue
of whether the court should look for "comparison evidence" in de-
termining whether a prima facie case of § 112, 6th structural equiv-
alency exists. Preliminarily, however, the decision raises the issue of
whether a Malta-type requirement, applied to the doctrine of equiv-
alents or to §112, 6th equivalents, conflicts with Rule 705, Fed.
R. Evid.
1. The Symbol Case
In setting forth its infringement case, Symbol offered the expert
testimony of Mr. Barkan, a co-inventor on each of the patents-in-
suit. Using charts which showed each claim broken down by limi-
tation, with numbers adjacent each limitation to designate corre-
sponding structure in the accused device, Mr. Barkan stated that in
his opinion each claim limitation was met by structure in the accused
device. 147 Mr. Barkan testified that his understanding of the claims
was based upon the claims themselves, as well as the specification
and statements made during the prosecution history. 48 Opticon failed
to cross-examine Mr. Barkan on the infringement issue.1 49
On appeal, Opticon contended that Symbol had failed to make
out a prima facie case of infringement. Particularly, Opticon pointed
to the fact that the asserted patent claims included means plus function
elements, and that Mr. Barkan failed to testify in detail regarding
equivalency between the structure of the accused device and the struc-
ture disclosed in the patent specification for performing the claimed
function.' 50
143 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
144 Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d at 1570, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1243.
145 Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d at 1570, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1244.




149 Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d at 1575-76, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245.
150 Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d at 1575, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245.
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The Federal Circuit disagreed. In the circumstances of this case,
Judge Clevenger opined, Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
"provide[d] the answer to whether Symbol made a prima facie show-
ing of infringement."' 51 Noting that testimony on the ultimate issue
of infringement had been held admissible in patent cases, Judge Clev-
enger found that the responsibility for challenging the factual under-
pinnings of the testimony through cross-examination fell squarely on
Opticon. 152 The judge observed that Opticon had chosen "not to
expose Barkan's testimony to the glaring light of cross-examination
on this issue," and so Opticon had therefore failed to seize the op-
portunity provided by Rule 705 to demonstrate that Mr. Barkan's
opinion testimony was factually incorrect. 153
Judge Clevenger provided a mixture of policy arguments and
precedent-based arguments to justify the court's decision. First, the
judge pointed out that Rule 705 functions to abbreviate trials by
permitting opinion testimony without factual foundation. The specific
purpose behind Rule 705, according to Judge Clevenger, is to avoid
complex and time consuming testimony. "Patent cases, so often typ-
ified by lengthy testimony on complex technical issues, are particu-
larly served by this purpose. ' ' 154
Judge Clevenger also noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence
are expressly applicable to all proceedings in courts of the United
States per Rule 101 of Fed. R. Evid.' 55 Finally, the court suggested
that the Federal Circuit had previously applied Rule 705 in similar
fashion to the issue of damages in a patent case, citing Studienge-
sellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus. 156
2. Conflict Between Malta and Rule 705
Malta and Symbol cannot be easily reconciled, considering that
similar infringement proofs were proffered (claim charts, expert tes-
timony) and similar analyses involved (equivalents), but contrasting
151 Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d at 1574-75, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245. Rule 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, entitled "Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion,"
provides that:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or interference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of
the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
152 Id.
153 Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d at 1576, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1246.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 862 F.2d 1564, 1567, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1273, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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results emerged. Careful examination of Symbol, however, reveals
that it fails to support the argument that Malta conflicts with Fed. R.
Evid. 705.
First, Rule 705, like all rules of evidence, sets a standard for
admissibility of evidence, not for its substantive effect. Thus, Rule
705 simply affirmatively answers the question of whether conclusory
expert testimony is admissible. Whether that evidence, alone or in
combination with other evidence, leads to the establishment of a
prima facie case of infringement is another matter entirely.
The Federal Circuit carefully articulated this distinction in Stu-
diengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., 157 relied upon in Sym-
bol. In reviewing (and ultimately upholding) a damages award based
upon conclusory expert testimony from plaintiff SGK's expert, the
Federal Circuit observed that:
We agree that pursuant to Rule 705 [SGK's expert] was not obligated to reveal the
facts or data underlying his opinion on a floor [for the reasonable royalty], because
Dart did not cross-examine on this issue and the master did not require otherwise.
But nothing in Rule 705 bears on the circumstances under which the trier of fact
or a reviewing court is required to credit expert testimony. 158
The Studiengesellschaft court amplified its views in explaining
the reasoning of United States v. Santarpio, 159 another case relied
upon in Symbol:
In the Santarpio case, an expert gave an opinion without describing or explaining
the relevance of the factors upon which he based it. He was not cross-examined
regarding his conclusion, and the First Circuit merely held that, under the cir-
umstances of that case, the district court "was entitled to credit the expert's con-
clusion." Thus, Rule 705 and Santarpio do not support SGK's conclusion that a
court must credit expert testimony which goes un-cross-examined, even if that
testimony is inherently unbelievable.Y6
Likewise, the patent challenger's failure to cross-examine the
expert is only relevant if the patent challenger is later objecting to
the admissibility of the testimony. If the patent owner's expert gives
wholly conclusory testimony on equivalents, and the patent chal-
lenger believes that the testimony combined with all of the other
157 862 F.2d 1564, 1567-68, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1273, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
158 Id. (emphasis supplied).
159 560 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Schepici v. United States, 434 U.S.
984 (1977).
160 862 F.2d at 1568, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1277.
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evidence does not add up to a prima facie case, the patent challenger
is perfectly free to dispense with cross-examination and make a Rule
52(c) motion for judgment on partial findings (in a bench trial) or a
Rule 50(a) motion (in a jury trial).
The Federal Circuit should clarify Symbol Technologies by rein-
forcing the correct position in Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart that
Rule 705 bears only on the admissibility of the expert testimony, not
on its substantive effect as creating a prima facie case of infringe-
ment. It would follow that no conflict arises between application of
the Malta requirements and Rule 705.
3. Malta and §112, 6th Equivalents
Comparing the doctrine of equivalents to §112, 6th equivalents
can be a risky endeavor, and the Federal Circuit has been known to
warn against confusing the two.' 6 1 Equivalents under §112, 6th are
used in the context of literal infringement. Nonetheless, it is appro-
priate for purposes of establishing standards for the prima facie case
that a parallel be drawn between § 112(6) equivalents and the doctrine
of equivalents. The Federal Circuit has noted that "the underlying
principles of equivalents in Graver Tank could be used in a §112
literal infringement analysis.' 1 62
To determine whether the means in an accused device for perform-
ing a function is structurally equivalent to the means disclosed in a
patent specification for performing that function, one would naturally
consider whether the means in the accused device operates in substan-
tially the same "way" as the disclosed means.1' 3 As with the doctrine
of equivalents, proof of "way" by descriptive evidence is insufficient.
Malta-style comparison evidence should be required, particularly when
the case is tried to a jury, for the same policy reasons that justify
requiring comparison evidence on the doctrine of equivalents.
161 See, e.g., DMI, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. 236, 239 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
162 Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 975, n.4., 226 U.S.P.Q. at 7, n.4. Recent statements from the
Federal Circuit that the doctrine of equivalents differs from §112, 6th equivalents because "it
is not necessary to consider the prior art in applying §112, Par. 6" do not change this conclusion.
General Instrument Corp., ... _F.2d at -, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1179.
163 See also Waldbaum and Sipiora, Pennwalt Redux-Judicial Uncertainty vs. Procrustean
Bed, 19 A.I.P.L.A.O.J. 237, 243 (1991) ("if the accused device performs an identical function
and employs substantially the same means to obtain the same result, then the device [literally]
infringes.") Of course, it is possible that if the accused device performs an equivalent function




The Malta case requires a patent owner asserting infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents to offer "comparison" evidence
comparing the function/way/result of the claimed and accused device
and explaining why the claimed and accused devices are alleged to
function in substantially the same way. A patent owner who fails to
do so will be subject to a motion for directed verdict or JNOV on
this issue.
"Particularized" and "linking argument" delineating the re-
quired comparison are sufficient to get the doctrine of equivalents
issue to the jury, but are not required. Under Malta, as long as the
evidence effects a comparison (as opposed to mere description), the
evidence is sufficient regardless of its form.
The Malta requirement of "comparison" evidence was applied
to determine whether a prima facie case of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents had been made out in the context of a jury
trial - specifically, to determine whether the evidence was "substan-
tial." But comparison evidence is needed to prevent the doctrine of
equivalents from becoming "a result-oriented catchall," and that need
does not vanish when the context shifts from jury trial to bench trial.
The Federal Circuit should confirm that the Malta comparison evi-
dence is a fundamental requirement for any prima facie case of in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents by applying the requirement
to bench trials.
Finally, the Malta "comparison" evidence should also be re-
quired as part of the prima facie case of literal infringement where
§112, 6th is involved. The Federal Circuit should rethink its po-
sition in Symbol Technologies and extend a Malta-type requirement
to §112 equivalents.
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